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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TIMOTHY G. GARCIA, 
De fendant/Appe11ant. 
Case No. 930104-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1987 & Supp. 1991), and Utah R. 
Crim. P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal 
action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final 
judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first degree or 
capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court's order of restitution, which was 
incurred by a governmental investigatory agency before the filing of 
a criminal Information, was improper and contrary to statutory 
authority, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201; 77-32a-2, and existing 
caselaw. See State v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162 (Utah 1992). 
"[The defendant's sentence [may be] remanded for 
resentencing 'because of the clear error in the original 
[sentence].,,f State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473-74 n.5 (Utah App. 
1991) (citing State v. Babbelf 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989)); see 
also State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) ("trial courts 
do not have discretion to misapply the law"); State v. Swapp, 808 
P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App.) ("When examining a trial court's 
interpretation of a statutory provision we apply a correction of 
error standard"), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); Grayson 
Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) ("A trial 
court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
"Unlawful Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consenting or Arranging 
to Distribute a Controlled" Substance, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), -(8)(1)(b)(i) 
(1992), and pursuant to a plea bargain, in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hansen, presiding. On December 21, 1992, 
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Mr. Garcia pleaded guilty to the above charge, (R 16-22), and the 
State dismissed another allegation. (R 16). 
On January 29, 1993, the trial court sentenced Mr. Garcia 
to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison (to be served concurrently with an unrelated sentence) and 
ordered him to pay a $1600 fine (plus surcharge). (R 26, 49). The 
court also ordered him to pay $240 in restitution to Metro 
Narcotics. Other statements relevant to this section are stated 
elsewhere in the brief. See infra Statement of the Facts. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 2, 1992, the State filed an Information against 
Mr. Garcia alleging two separate counts of "Unlawful Distribution, 
Offering, Agreeing, Consenting or Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled" Substance, both second degree felonies. (R 06). The 
charges contained virtually identical allegations with the exception 
of the date in question. As part of the plea bargain negotiations, 
the State agreed to dismiss one of the counts in exchange for a 
guilty plea to the other remaining charge. (R 16). 
At sentencing, the parties did not dispute that Metro 
Narcotics used $480 in their undercover sting operation. (R 44). 
However, counsel for Mr. Garcia requested the trial court to not 
impose the $480 as restitution because "that's a cost of 
prosecution, Your Honor, and investigation[.]" (R 44). 
The State disagreed in part, explaining: "Your Honor, I 
think he [Mr. Garcia] should be at least responsible for the 
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restitution on the count he plead to. If that's half of this 
amount, $240.00, but I think that's money he should be responsible 
for paying." (R 48). 
The trial court imposed sentence as follows: "Inasmuch as 
there's no agreement regarding restitution on count one, I'm 
satisfied that I do not have the option of ordering restitution as 
to count one. I will, however, order restitution on count two, 
which is $240.00. That restitution is to Metro Narcotics Strikes 
Force." (R 49) (footnote added). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's order of restitution was improper. 
"Metro Narcotics," the governmental investigatory agency, was not a 
"victim" that suffered "pecuniary damages." Instead, the money 
expended by the agency—prior to the filing of the Information— 
constituted nonrecoverable costs of investigation. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF RESTITUTION, MONEY EXPENDED 
BY THE POLICE PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION, 
CONSTITUTED NONRECOVERABLE COSTS OF INVESTIGATION 
The trial court's authority to order restitution stems from 
the sentencing statute which reads in pertinent part: 
When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity 
which has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition 
1 Since the State dismissed count I, Mr. Garcia did not 
"agree" to plead guilty to count I. His plea agreement only 
required him to plead guilty to count II. (R 16-22). 
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to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution up to double 
the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim . . . 
unless the court in applying the criteria of 
Subsection (3)(b) finds that restitution is 
inappropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(a)(i) (emphasis added); see also State 
v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162 (Utah 1992) (the "defense costs" statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2f should also be examined to determine the 
validity of the restitution order). As discussed below, the trial 
court erred when it ordered Mr. Garcia to pay $240.00 in restitution 
to the "Metro Strike Force." (R 26, 49). Metro Narcotics was not a 
"victim" in the case at bar. See People v. Chaney, 544 N.E.2d 90 
(111. App. 3 Dist. 1989) (citing People v. Evansf 461 N.E.2d 634 
(111. App. 3 Dist. 1984)). 
In Evans, the defendant argued "that the trial court 
exceeded its sentencing authority in ordering restitution of $180 to 
MEG [Multi-County Drug Enforcement Group]." Id. at 639. The $180 
was "drug money" used in an undercover operation. Id. at 636. But 
cf. id. (a court imposed fine or forfeiture proceeding was proper). 
The appellate court agreed, reasoning: 
While certainly we would be remiss were we to hold 
that unlawful delivery of a controlled substance is a 
victimless crime, we would be blinking reality were we 
not to acknowledge that many, if not most, offenders 
are brought to justice through the efforts of 
undercover agents making buys with public monies. We 
will not, however, strain the commonly accepted 
understanding of the word "victim" so as to include 
the public drug enforcement agency, MEG, in the case 
before us. Where public monies are expended in the 
pursuit of solving crimes, the expenditure is part of 
the investigating agency's normal operating costs. 
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The governmental entity conducting an investigation is 
not therefore considered a "victim" to the extent that 
public monies are so expended. 
Evans, 461 N.E.2d at 639 (emphasis added); accord United States v. 
Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1980); State v. Jones, 724 P.2d 146 
(Kan. App. 1986) (the State of Kansas is not a victim for purposes 
of "investigative costs and costs of apprehension"). 
Like the $180 restitution payment improperly imposed in 
Evans, see 461 N.E.2d at 639, the court here also illegally ordered 
Timothy Garcia to pay $240 in restitution. (R 26, 49). Mr. Garcia 
respectfully requests this Court to correct the illegally imposed 
portion of his sentence. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may 
correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time"); State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991); 
People v. Chaney, 544 N.E.2d 90 (111. App. 3 Dist. 1989) (citing 
People v. Evans, 461 N.E.2d 634 (111. App. 3 Dist. 1984)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has already implicitly rejected such 
orders of restitution. See State v. DePaoli, 835 P.2d 162 (Utah 
1992) . At issue in Depaoli was whether the trial court erroneously 
required the defendant to pay the cost of a "code R examination," an 
amount expended by the Salt Lake City Police Department ("SLCPD") 
for purposes of a rape investigation. After examining two relevant 
statutory provisions, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (restitution) and 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2 (defense costs), the Court determined that 
the SLCPD did not fall within the definition of a "victim" because 
the police suffered no "pecuniary damages." Depaolif 835 P.2d 
at 164. 
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Noteworthy in Depaoli is the State's argument which was 
rejected by our supreme court. The State "argue[d], the SLCPD 
'incurred a medical expense on behalf of the victim as a direct 
result of the sexual assault, and thus, became a victim itself for 
purposes of the restitution statute.'" Id. at 164. The State's 
argument there is akin to the State's argument here. The 
restitution order here should also be rejected. 
As is evident by the restitution order itself, neither the 
court nor Metro Narcotics expected remuneration for drug 
investigations. (R 26, 49). On November 2, 1991, the State filed 
an Information against Mr. Garcia, alleging two counts of unlawful 
distribution of narcotics. (R 6-8). However, the court's 
restitution order only encompassed the $240 used for one of the 
alleged drug transactions. Metro Narcotics may have spent money on 
the other alleged transaction, but no similar order of restitution 
was entered. 
In fact, the prosecutor below noted: "Your Honor, I think 
he [Mr. Garcia] should be at least responsible for the restitution 
on the count he plead to. If that's half of this amount, $240.00, 
but I think that's money he should be responsible for paying." 
(R 48). Similarly, since Mr. Garcia did not agree to plead guilty 
to count I, the trial court concluded that it "[did] not have the 
option of ordering restitution as to count one. I will, however, 
order restitution on count two, which is $240.00. That restitution 
is to Metro Narcotics Strikes Force." (R 49). 
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These statements, however, are contrary to the proper 
interpretation of the applicable statutory authority and recently 
decided caselaw. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201; 77-32a-2; State v. 
Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162 (Utah 1992). The money constitutes 
nonrecoverable "general damages," see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (not 
pecuniary damages), which are not sought after civilly. The money 
is simply "written off" as a cost of investigation. (R 6-8, 48, 49) 
(after count I was dismissed, both the prosecutor and the trial 
court declined to seek its recovery). 
Consistent with this position is the Depaoli Court's 
analysis of the "defense costs" statute: 
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred 
by the state or any political subdivision thereof in 
prosecuting the defendant, including attorney fees of 
counsel assigned to represent the defendant pursuant 
to Section 77-32-2 and investigators' fees. Costs 
cannot include expenses inherent in providing a 
constitutionally guaranteed trial or expenditures in 
connection with the maintenance and operation of 
government agencies that must be made by the public 
irrespective of specific violations of law. Costs 
cannot include attorneys' fees of prosecuting 
attorneys or expenses incurred by the prosecution for 
investigators or witnesses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2 (emphasis added), reprinted in, Depaoli, 
835 P.2d at 164. 
In holding that the cost of a code R examination could not 
be recovered, the Depaoli Court reasoned "prosecution does not begin 
until there is a named defendant who has been charged." Depaoli, 
835 P.2d at 165. "[T]he cost of the examination was incurred by the 
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prosecution in the course of the investigation and prior to the time 
of the filing of the criminal information." Id. at 165; see also 
State v. Haynes, 53 Or. App. 850, 633 P.2d 38 (1981) (an opinion 
whose reasoning was agreed upon by our supreme court). 
Additionally, our [Utah's] statute contains a 
provision not specifically contained in the Oregon 
statute: "Costs cannot include attorneys' fees of 
prosecuting attorneys or expenses incurred by the 
prosecution for investigators or witnesses." 
§ 77-32a-2. Since expenses incurred by the 
prosecution for investigators are not allowed, it 
logically follows that costs of investigation would 
likewise be ineligible for restitution. 
Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 165 (emphasis added). 
Like the code R examination which was undoubtedly 
"performed within hours of the sexual assault[,]" the $240 here 
"changed hands" well before "the time of the filing of the criminal 
information." Cf. Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 165. Consequently, Utah's 
"defense costs" statute (particularly its last sentence), further 
establishes that the trial court's $240 order of restitution was 
improper. Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Garcia respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
trial court's order of restitution. 
SUBMITTED this 7-T day of May, 1993. 
R0*|ALD S> FfJJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
58-37-3. Prohibited acts — Penalt ies [Effective until Ju ly 
1. 1990J* 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally: (1) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub* 
(iD distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
(uD possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of snbsrnnrm 
listed in Schedules H through V except under an order or 
tiorn or 
(IT) possess a (Tingulled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
uSStrxouse* 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection flXa) with respect to: 
(3 a substance classified in Schedule I or H is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony: 
(iO a substance classified in Schedule HI or IV. or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second de-
gree felony; or 
Gii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
77-32a-2« Costs — What constitute. 
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state or any 
political subdivision thereof in prosecuting the defendant, including attorney 
fees of counsel assigned to represent the defendant pursuant to Section 
77-32-2 and investigators' fees. Costs cannot include expenses inherent in 
providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial or expenditures in connection 
with the maintenance and operation of government agencies that must be 
made by the public irrespective of specific violations of law. Costs cannot 
inHTH» attorneys7 fees of prosecuting attorneys or expenses incurred by the 
prosecution for investigators or witnesses. 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not 
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his absence, he 
may likewise be sentenced in his absence, if a defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the 
time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions — 
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of 
crimes with mandatory sentences. 
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the 
right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and re-
cover damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defen-
dant has paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part or Section 
"-18-1, may not be introduced in any civil action arising out of the facts or 
events which were the basis for the restitution. However, the court ^ a i i 
credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment 
in favor of the victim in the civil action. 
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a defen-
dant's liability for pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively 
determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent civil action. 
(3) (a) (i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitu-
tion up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or 
victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded guilty, is 
convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by 
the defendant to the sentencing court unless the court in applying the 
criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that restitution is inappropriate. 
Whether the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. 
(ii) When a defendant has oeen extradited to this state under Title 
77, Chapter 30, or has been transported at governmental expense 
from one county to another within the state for the purpose of resolv-
ing pending criminal charges and is adjudged guilty of criminal ac-
tivity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defen-
dant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity 
for the extradition or transportation. In determining whether restitu-
tion is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in Subsection 
(3)(b). If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. The court shall send a copy of its order of restitution 
to the Division of Finance. 
(b) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution 
which is complete, partial, or nominal, the court shall take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time o£ sentencing allow him a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(4) As used in Subsection (3): 
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is. 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits-
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's crimi-
nal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of 
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such 
as earnings and medical expenses. 
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including insured damages. 
(d) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suf-
fered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activ-
ities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(5)' (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances 
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or pre-
senting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposi-
tion of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(6) (a) If a defendant subject to Subsection (5) has been sentenced and com-
mitted to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the 
date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the recom-
mendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and commitment 
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if 
he had not previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no 
greater than the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time pre-
scribed by statute. The resentencing provided for in this section shall take 
into consideration the sentencing guidelines established under this sec-
tion by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to eliminate 
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. Credit 
shall be given for time served. 
(b) The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the 
record at the time of sentencing. The court shall also inform the defen-
dant as part of the sentence that if the defendant is released from prison 
he may be on parole for a period of ten years. 
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, 
rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse 
of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and 
if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by 
the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant 
shall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This 
subsection takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law. 
